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A border opening onto numerous
geopolitical issues
The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture
Sébastien Colin
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 On September  3rd 2002,  the  Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture  celebrated the
fiftieth anniversary of its founding.
2 Yanbian is located in the province of Jilin; of China’s thirty autonomous prefectures, it
is  the  only  one  in  the  northeast  (1).  It  is  the  largest  administrative entity  in  the
province,  covering  an  area  of  42,700  square  kilometres;  it  is  subdivided  into  six
municipalities,  Yanji,  Longjing,  Helong,  Tumen,  Dunhua  and  Hunchun,  and  two
counties, Antu and Wangqing (see map). As the layout of the hydrographical network
indicates, Yanbian is oriented towards China’s frontier with North Korea and towards
the sea. The landscape is dominated by an arc of wooded mountainside cut across with
valleys that come together at the level of Yanji and Tumen and then merge into a vast
plain  around  Hunchun.  Most  of  its  people  and  its  cultivated  land  are  naturally
concentrated along these valleys and on the plain. Despite everything, the prefecture
has two outstanding geographical features: its shared frontier with Russia and North
Korea,  and its  ethnic  composition,  which,  at  about  840,000  people, has  the  highest
concentration of Chinese Koreans (Chaoxianzu) 1. On the scale of the prefecture itself,
however, this ethnic Korean population is still in the minority: in 2000, it represented
only 38.55% of Yanbian’s 2,184,000 inhabitants, set against the 58.54% of Chinese Han.
Lastly, the population is unevenly distributed: the administrative entities close to the
frontier with North Korea have higher proportions of Koreans than those further away,
where the Han are in the majority (see map and Table 2). 
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3 This  distribution  is  historical  in  origin.  Unlike  many  other  mino  rities,  the  ethnic
Koreans came to Chinese territory as immigrants and not through territorial expansion
3. Migrating to a region that was virtually free of human settlement in the second half
of the nineteenth century, the Korean peasants were thus able to settle on the plains
within reach of the border.
4 The  festivities  organised  in  commemoration  of  the  anniversary  gave  the  central,
provincial and local authorities the opportunity to celebrate the characteristic features
of Korean culture and to re-emphasise the importance of economic development to the
prefecture 4. The aim, as every September, was also to encourage harmonious relations
between the various “nationalities” living within the prefecture 5.  Even though the
festivities were longer and more spectacular, this celebration of the anniversary would
hardly  have  differed  from  the  annual  rejoicing  had  it  not  been  introduced  by  the
sanguan jiaoyu campaign, organised by the provincial government, supported by the
central  government  and  aimed  at  the  Korean  minority.  Its  main  objective  was  to
remind people of the importance of unity between the “nationalities” in the successful
pursuit of development 6. The sanguan jiaoyu campaign (teaching the three principles
governing relations between the minorities and the Han) demonstrates that the central
government is keeping a careful eye on the behaviour of the Yanbian Koreans. Indeed,
since the prefecture opened its frontiers to North Korea in the mid-1980s and South
Korea in the early 1990s, the two neighbours are tending to pose new problems for the
Chinese authorities.
5 The decision to open up Yanbian was made for two reasons. The first was a matter of
foreign  policy:  Yanbian  and  the  Korean  minority  were  to  be  incorporated  within
China’s  new  strategy  towards  the  Korean  peninsular,  the  objective  of  which  is  to
encourage the reunification of the two Koreas. The second consideration was domestic:
frontier  security  was  to  be  assured by favouring the economic  development of  the
prefecture.  These  two  strategic  concerns  gave  birth  to  an  ambitious  development
policy in the first half of the 1990s. However, the consequences were not quite those
anticipated.  In  fact,  economic  growth  slowed  during  the  second  half  of  the  1990s,
aggravating  the  economic  and  social  unrest within  the  Korean  population,  among
whom  some  individuals  maintain  relations  with  the  two  Koreas  that  have  raised
problems for the Chinese central government. Peking is embarrassed in particular by
the many Chaoxianzu who have emigrated to South Korea and by the complicity of some
in  the  smuggling  of  North  Korean  refugees  into  Peking  and  South  Korea.  These
activities,  which  at  the  local  level  are  possible  causes  of  destabilisation,  also  raise
diplomatic tensions between China and the two Koreas.
Faced with these new problems, the central government has recently been attempting
to reinvigorate the development of Yanbian.
Opening up Yanbian at the end of the 1980s: what was at stake?From the founding of
Yanbian to the opening up of the frontier: a historical reminder
6 In  the  beginning,  Yanbian  was  a  former  clearance  area  that  the  Qing  government
created  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  accommodate  the  many  Korean
peasants who were emigrating from the provinces in the northeast of Korea. Following
this opening of the frontier, Japan’s take-over of Korea, first as a protectorate in 1905
and then by annexation in 1910, led to new waves of Korean immigration into Yanbian.
Between  1881  and  1931,  the  Korean  population  of  Yanbian  swelled  from  10,000  to
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396,850 people. On the eve of the Japanese defeat, it had reached 635,000 people, which
represented 74% of the total population 7.
7 Yanbian was founded for reasons of foreign policy. The Qing rulers needed to respond
both to the pressure of Han and Korean immigration and to the threats posed by Russia
and Japan. In 1858 and 1860, two treaties were signed that drew the frontier between
the Chinese and Russian empires: China lost an immense sweep of territory, including
its access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan). The meeting point of the Russian, Korean and
Chinese frontiers was then fixed on the northern bank of the Tumen river about 15
kilometres from the coast  8.  At  the same time,  Han and Korean peasants,  from the
Chinese  provinces  of  Shandong  and  Hebei  respectively,  and  from  the  northern
provinces  of  Korea,  began  to  settle  illegally  in  the  Yanbian  region  9.  This  illegal
immigration into Chinese territory, on the fringes of Korea and Russia, greatly troubled
the  Qing  court.  Indeed,  while  it  helped  to  populate  the  frontier  regions,  this
immigration nevertheless had to be controlled, lest it be exploited by the Russians and
the  Japanese  whose  influence  in  Korea  was  growing  10.  Lastly,  by  welcoming  the
immigrants, China could show that it offered protection to the Korean population and
could thus increase its influence in the domestic affairs of the peninsular, which the
Korean authorities were finding increasingly hard to control, and fend off its Russian
and Japanese enemies.
 
Table1: Han and Korean populations in Yanbian’s municipalities and districts (2000)
Source: Yanbian tongji nianjian 2001, Yanji, Yanbian renmin chubanshe, 2001, pp.67-68 and 73.
8 However, when Japan established its domination of Korea, at the start of the twentieth
century,  it  took the large Korean population in the clearance area as  a  pretext  for
justifying new territorial  ambitions.  For  Japan,  these  people,  just  like  those  on the
peninsular, had to be afforded its “protection”. The Korean population of Yanbian then
became  a  real  issue  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  authorities,  with  each
government attempting to win its support 11.  Even though a section of the Yanbian
Koreans aligned itself with Japan—which moved into Yanbian as early as 1907 and then
into the rest  of  Manchuria in 1931—most of  them joined the communist  camp and
struggled against the invader.
9 The large proportion of Korean people on the edge of the Chinese territory and the role
the Koreans played in resisting not just the Japanese but also the Kuomintang regime,
were the main reasons that qualified Yanbian for autonomous status.
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The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture
10 The “Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region” (Yanbian Chaoxianzu zizhiqu) was founded on
3 September 1952. However, despite its title of zizhiqu, a term also used to designate
autonomous  regions  at  the  provincial  level,  Yanbian  remained  subordinate  to  the
province  of  Jilin.  After  the  1954  Constitution  was  published,  which  converted
autonomous  regions  under  the  jurisdiction  of  provinces  (zizhiqu)  into  prefectures
(zhou),  the  State  Council  officially  promulgated  in  April  1955  the  creation  of  the
“Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture” (Yanbian Chaoxianzu zizhizhou) 12. 
11 Between 1952 and 1957, regional autonomy was put into genuine practice in Yanbian.
The Korean minority was strongly represented in the various authorities of the Chinese
Communist  Party (CCP) and local  government,  and the Autonomous Prefecture was
considered by the central government to be a “model of autonomy”. It was the most
advanced autonomous administrative entity in China: in fact,  the standard of living
enjoyed by the Koreans and their levels of education were even higher than those of
the Han. The autonomy granted to Yanbian did not, unfortunately, last for long. The
Great  Leap  Forward  and  the  Cultural  Revolution  witnessed  the  imposition  of  an
assimilation policy. The prefecture’s shared frontiers with the Soviet Union and North
Korea added greater intensity to these campaigns of repression. The Sino-Soviet schism
of  1959  and  the  ups  and  downs  that  affected  China’s  relations  with  North  Korea
between 1958  and 1970  made  Yanbian a  very  sensitive  region.  During  the  Cultural
Revolution,  Yanbian  even  became  totally  militarised,  dominated  by  the  People’s
Liberation Army, with Mao Yuanxin, Mao Zedong’s own nephew 13 at its head. 
12 It was not until Deng Xiaoping had come to power, and not until the 1982 Constitution
and the May 1984 “Law on the Autonomy of Regional Nationalities” had both been
promulgated, that policy towards the national minorities was to become more lenient
and that the term “regional autonomy” came to mean something again. 
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13 In  Yanbian,  this  revival  took  concrete  form  in  1985  with  the  promulgation  of
regulations laying down the law on the autonomy of the prefecture (Yanbian Chaoxianzu
zizhizhou  zizhi  tiaoli)  and  the  representation  of  Koreans  in  local  political  and
administrative bodies. A year later, the prefecture authorities published three other
regulations  on  the  use  of  the  Korean  language,  the  development  of  traditional
Chaoxianzu culture and the production of traditional Korean products; the regulations
also set up a body responsible for promoting economic and cultural exchanges with
foreign countries (haiwai lianyi hui). In all, more than 70 regulations were implemented
between 1985 and 1988, concerning, among other things, agriculture, forestry, science,
education, health, family planning, taxation and commerce 14. 
14 These reforms followed the visit to Yanbian in 1983 by Deng Xiaoping, during which he
declared himself in favour of “a swift and improved building up of the Yanbian Korean
Autonomous Prefecture” (ba Yanbian Chaoxianzu zizhizhou jianshe de geng kuai xie geng hao
xie), thus marking the first stage towards opening up the prefecture’s frontier with the
outside world 15.
The strategic motivation behind the opening up of the frontier
15 The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had left  the Party’s credibility
greatly diminished and had poisoned relationships between the Koreans and the Han.
Deng’s visit and the renewal of economic development were a means for the Party to
win back the confidence of the Yanbian Koreans. This new attitude had a further aim:
Peking’s new policy towards the Korean peninsular might profit from the co-operation
of China’s Chaoxianzu 16. 
16 Firstly,  the  central  government  needed  to  revive  its  relations  with  North  Korea’s
leaders. Indeed, the normalisation of China’s diplomatic relations with Japan and then
the United States during the 1970s as well as the opening up of the market economy in
1978 were sharply criticised by North Korea, which then tightened its links with the
USSR.  Secondly,  the  government  wished  to  restore  its  position  at  the  centre  of
Northeast Asia, not only by rebuilding its relationship with the Soviet Union (and later
Russia) but also by acting as go-between in bringing the two Koreas together. To that
end, the Chinese government had to opt for normalising its relations with the south
while taking care not to put a strain on its links with the north. The closeness of these
links was proving all the more important in that the appearance of serious economic
difficulties might threaten the survival of the North Korean regime, which might in
turn leave the Chinese government fearful for the stability of its frontier.
17 In order to confront these numerous issues,  from the end of the 1980s,  the central
government  allied  itself  with  provincial  and  local  initiatives  to  implement  a  new
economic policy, symbolised by the Tumen River Area Development Programme. This
programme  was  designed,  among  other  objectives,  to  promote  the  economic
development of  Yanbian,  to offer the prefecture access to South Korea and to help
launch North Korea along the path of reform 17. The policy satisfied a national need by
enabling China to narrow the currently growing gap between Yanbian’s slow economic
development and the rapid advances being made in the coastal provinces, a gap that
might feed local discontent in Yanbian and also threaten the stability of the frontier 18.
18 Thus, when Jiang Zemin, then Secretary General of the Party, visited Yanbian between
7 and 9 January 1991, he proclaimed the central government’s wish to make Yanbian a
“model  prefecture”  for  the  whole  country.  He  encouraged  the  local  authorities  to
parade  the  various  advantages  that  the  prefecture  enjoyed,  such  as  its  “ideal
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geographical position” on the frontiers of Russia and North Korea and in the centre of
Northeast Asia, its rich natural resources (such as wood and medicinal plants) and its
picturesque landscape (mainly with tourism in mind) 19. He repeatedly encouraged the
local authorities to continue exploiting the ethnic network of the Korean population so
as to form closer economic and trading links with the two Koreas 20.
The openness strategy of the 1990s and its problemsThe launch of the Tumen project
19 The start of the reforms took the form of reopening the frontier with North Korea,
which  had  been  closed  since  the  start  of  the  Cultural  Revolution.  First  of  all,  the
Chinese and North Korean authorities established relations between localities (21), and
then they reactivated treaties signed during the 1950s and the early 1960s, among them
an agreement on cross-border movement 22. Trade was also built up, reaching a value of
52 million dollars by 1989 23. This reopening was encouraged by an important political
act, the visit to Yanbian in 1984 of Hu Yaobang, then Secretary General of the CCP, and
Kim  Il-Sung,  whose  regime  promulgated  in  September  of  that  year  a  law  allowing
foreign investment.
20 However, some local and provincial leaders judged this reopening to be economically
inadequate. In their view, these two administrative entities of Northeast China were
lagging behind the coastal provinces in development because the region was isolated,
having been cut off from access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan) since the latter half of the
nineteenth century. This is when the idea of establishing an economic zone around the
meeting point of the Chinese, Russian and North Korean frontiers, with the financial
support  of  Japan,  South  Korea  and  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme
(UNDP), was first mooted. This local project, which was called, symbolically, the Tumen
River Economic Development Zone,  was aimed at  renovating existing infrastructure
and building new projects to improve transport (roads, railways, port installations and
frontier posts) so as to regain access to the sea by using the Russian ports of Zarubino
and Posjet and the North Korean ports of Rajin and Chongjin.
 
Table 2: Main foreign investments in Yanbian since the opening of the border in June 2002.
Source: Yanbian chaoxianzu zizhizhou duiwai jingji maoyi ding (The foreign economy and foreign
trade ofﬁce of the yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture), summer 2002.
21 During the first half of the 1990s, the central government took an active part in the
financing of the infrastructure. With its international objectives in mind, it gave strong
encouragement to the local authorities to attract investment from abroad by creating,
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in Hunchun in March 1992, a frontier zone of economic co-operation (bianjing jingji
hezuoqu), a project driven directly from Peking; and it gave the go-ahead to the Jilin
authorities for several economic development zones at the provincial level across the
rest  of  the  prefecture  24.  In  addition,  the  central  government  played  a  key  role  in
encouraging  the  North  Korean  authorities  to  set  up  the  economic  zone  of  Rajin-
Sonbong in 1991 and in persuading them not to leave the Tumen programme when
they threatened to do so at the time of the first nuclear crisis in 1994. It was also a
Chinese company in Yanbian, the Xiantong Haiyun Jituan Youxian Gongsi that, as the only
company using the port of Rajin, was largely responsible for its renovation, relieving
the failing North Korea of this task 25. 
22 While the Tumen programme did, of course, help to open up Yanbian, the economic
results  of  the  decade  as  a  whole  remained  disappointing.  Even  today,  numerous
problems remain.
Persistent economic difficulties
23 The economy of Yanbian experienced a sharp slowdown during the second half of the
1990s. Its falling ranking among China’s 30 autonomous prefectures perfectly illustrates
this decline. From being the most developed of the autonomous prefectures in 1990, by
1995 Yanbian had slipped to second place and by 2000 to fifth place. In 1995, the value
of its industrial production was 94 billion yuan, which was 38 billion less than the most
developed  of  its  rivals,  the  autonomous  prefecture  of  the  Kazakhs  of  Yili  in  the
autonomous region of Xinjiang. In 1999, not only had the gap between Yanbian and Yili
widened—from 38 billion to 62 billion yuan—but by that year Yanbian had also been
overtaken by  three  other  autonomous  prefectures,  those  of  the  Yi  of  Liangshan in
Sichuan province, the Hani and Yi of Honghe in Yunnan province, and lastly the Bai of
Dali, also in Yunnan 26. 
24 The prefecture of the Yanbian Koreans remains poor in terms of foreign investment.
Between the end of the 1980s and June 2002, it attracted only 615 enterprises, worth a
total of 615 million dollars (see Table 2) 27. Despite the new fiscal policies implemented
during  the  first  half  of  the  1990s,  taxes  are  still  considered  too  onerous  and  too
numerous. Yanbian’s workforce suffers from a cruel lack of skills in key sectors such as
the environment, foreign languages and new technologies 28. While the presence of the
Korean minority has helped to attract a large number of Korean businesses, these are
only small and medium-sized enterprises profiting from cheap labour. The big South
Korean groups invest elsewhere, mainly in the provinces of Liaoning and Shandong.
The ethnic network is in fact much more beneficial to the individual and to the family
economy: members of the Korean minority use it primarily to go and work in South
Korea and to trade with Koreans on the peninsular or with foreigners of Korean origin
29. Lastly, the industrial structure of the prefecture is still overly dominated by state
enterprises whose technology dates back to the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s; it does
not boast enough enterprises capable of offering products with a high added value. The
proportion of such products within overall industrial production is the smallest to be
found anywhere in Jilin province 30. 
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Table 3: Volume of foreign trade of the Yanbian prefecture (US$’000)
Source: Yanbian chaoxianzu zizhizhou duiwai jingji maoyi ding (The foreign economy and foreign
trade ofﬁce of the yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture), summer 2002.
25 Yanbian’s  low  level  of  economic  dynamism  is  also  evident  in  its  external  trade.
Admittedly, the level did rise between 1991 and 2000, but its progress was very uneven
(see Table 3). Russia and North Korea, Yanbian’s main trading partners at the start of
the 1990s,  were overtaken by South Korea and Japan as  a  result  of  the collapse of
China’s trade with Russia and North Korea in the mid 1990s. Each of these partners
represented trade worth 50 million dollars by 2000, and although these figures have
certainly increased since, the value is still  inadequate 31.  A large share of the cross-
border trade is accounted for by private companies (minying qiye) which take advantage
of  the  existing  markets  at  each  of  the  prefecture’s  frontier  posts  to  sell,  buy  or
exchange 32. However, most of the trade flowing between China and Russia and between
China and North Korea bypasses Yanbian. National trading between China and Russia
flows more to  the north,  through the province of  Heilongjiang,  and trade between
China and North Korea uses the frontier crossings further to the south in the province
of Liaoning 33. So the isolation of the prefecture is still a reality. Moreover, the main
trade routes between Yanbian and South Korea and between Yanbian and Japan—which
remain modest despite, admittedly, experiencing steady growth—go through the port
of Dalian, neglecting the ports in the Tumen zone even though they are much closer.
Why the impetus has been lost
26 The economic difficulties of Yanbian find their explanation in the numerous obstacles
that the Tumen programme has encountered—and continues to encounter 34.
27 Because of the inadequate transport and port infrastructure, access to the sea—which
was, after all,  the initial aim of the project—is still  not completely operational.  The
investment needed is lacking; the failure to complete the infrastructure is a handicap
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to  trade  and  puts  off  foreign  investors.  State  investment  by  the  Chinese  central
authorities also dwindled in the second half of the 1990s 35. There are two main reasons
for  this  reduction.  As  a  programme  for  cross-border  co-operation,  the  Tumen
programme cannot succeed without the active participation of the Russian and North
Korean  partners.  Yet  the  considerable  political  reluctance  of  the  local  Russian
authorities  in  Primorskiy  and  of  the  North  Korean  government  has  contributed
strongly to slowing down the project.  Moreover,  the nuclear crisis  of  1994 and the
death of Kim Il-Sung strained relations between Pyongyang and Peking. At the same
time,  the  launch of  the  Ninth Five-Year  Plan (1996-2000)  turned Peking’s  attention
towards  the  development  of  China’s  central  and  western  provinces,  which  largely
explains  the  stronger  economic  growth achieved in  the  autonomous  prefectures  of
these regions.
28 Within the prefecture, the Tumen programme has also been paralysed by the numerous
tensions that it has itself created between Yanbian’s main centres. Indeed, the lion’s
share of the profit has gone to the frontier municipality of Hunchun, which received
the majority of the investments from Peking, while the railway connecting Yanji to
North  Korea  via  Longjing  was  renovated  only  with  the  help  of  local  funding.  This
unequal treatment, deliberate on the part of the central government, has had the effect
of sowing discontent among the areas that believe they have lost out in the unfolding
of the programme (including Yanji, Longjing and Helong) 36. 
29 While  the  implementation  of  the  Tumen  programme  has  enabled  the  central
government to use Yanbian and its Korean minority to further its strategy aimed at the
two  Koreas,  active  Korean  participation  also  appears  essential  for  the  successful
economic development of this prefecture. Yet North Korean reluctance and the overly
timid economic participation of South Korean investors have combined to damage it
fatally. The absence of economic prospects for Yanbian in the context of the opening up
of the frontier has a number of consequences for the Korean minority, which is, in turn,
causing problems, diplomatic ones in particular, for the Chinese authorities.
The consequences for the Korean minority of opening up the frontier
30 Opening up Yanbian to Korean influence from the mid-1980s onwards seemed a gamble
on frontier  stability.  While  it  was  necessary,  from the point  of  view of  the central
government, to confront problems both within and without China, it also demonstrated
the  trust  placed  in  the  Korean  minority.  Because  the  Chaoxianzu were  strongly
politicised and relatively faithful to the CCP, the central government then qualified
them as  “a  model  minority”,  and they considered themselves  as  Chinese  people  of
Korean origin. This double identity, which is common among immigrant populations,
was reinforced by the important political role that the Korean minority had played in
the history of the People’s Republic as well as by the different policies that the central
government  directed  towards  it  37.  So,  just  as  it  had  done  in  the  past,  the  central
government again played on the double identity of the Chaoxianzu in the early 1980s in
the hope that they would play a positive role in reconciling the two Koreas. Here again,
however, the outcome fell far short of the intention.
An economic and social malaise driving people to emigrate
31 The  economic  slowdown  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  particularly  affected  the
Korean minority. In Yanbian, Koreans were mainly employed in producing rice, fruit
(primarily  apples)  and tobacco,  and they suffered the full  force  of  the  competition
whipped up by the reform policy 38. Unlike the Han, they would not, or could not, adapt
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39. The impact was immediate. The Koreans saw their incomes drop and the gap widen
between  them  and  the  Han.  While  the  situation  in  the  towns  is  relieved  by  the
employment of some Koreans in foreign trade and by the availability of work in South
Korea, many Koreans are still wretchedly poor 40. These social problems have driven
ever more Koreans to emigrate from Yanbian, a process that began from the moment
the frontier was opened.
32 The  Yanbian  Koreans  have  migrated  in  the  following  three  ways,  though  not
necessarily in this order 41. First there was the rural exodus. Hard hit by the reforms,
many Korean peasants fled the countryside to the prefecture’s main urban centres. In
2000, the three municipalities of Yanji, Hunchun and Dunhua, the location of the urban
centres  of  the  same name that  have  profited  most  by  development,  were  the  only
administrative entities to record a positive migratory balance, unlike the municipalities
of Longjing, Helong and Tumen, to which rural Koreans have flocked in great numbers
(see Table 4). When they do not go to the main urban centres within the prefecture, the
Koreans flee Yanbian for the great developed cities of China where economic prospects
are  best.  As  well  as  Peking  and  the  four  great  cities  of  the  northeast  (Harbin,
Changchun, Shenyang and Dalian), migrants favour the Shandong municipalities (such
as  Jinan,  Qingdao and Yantai)  and those  of  the  other  coastal  provinces.  Lastly,  the
opening of the Yanbian frontier has offered new prospects for immigration. At first, the
Yanbian  Koreans  made  their  way  to  North  Korea  and  the  Soviet  Union,  but  the
economic difficulties of these countries brought such population movements rapidly to
an end. Salvation came in the renewal of trading relations between China and South
Korea at the end of the 1980s and then in the normalisation of diplomatic links in 1992.
South Korea has since become a real El Dorado, and it is to here that many Koreans
from Yanbian and elsewhere in China attempt legally or illegally to migrate, mainly to
work. According to some estimates, Chinese Koreans there numbered 23,000 in 1992
and over 40,000 by 1994 42. By spring 2000, 92,000 were officially registered by the South
Korean authorities but, according to some estimates that included illegal immigrants,
their number had risen to 150,000 or 200,000, which is more than half the immigrant
workforce settled in South Korea 43. While it is difficult to estimate the exact proportion
of those who came from Yanbian, there is no doubt that it is significant. Indeed, since
the frontiers opened, about 200,000 Yanbian Koreans have gone abroad 44.
33 At the same time, and partly linked to this emigration, a slowdown has been recorded
since the early 1990s in the growth of the Yanbian Korean population. Caused by a
significant fall in the birth rate, population growth even became negative in the second
half of the 1990s (see Table 5). The fall in the birth rate is largely explained by the male-
female imbalance in the countryside over several previous years; as a result of the high
level  of  female emigration,  this  imbalance became particularly apparent during the
1990s.  Today,  the figures indicate that  there are four men for every woman in the
Yanbian countryside 45.
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Table 4: Demographic dynamics of the population of Yanbian, by district and municipality (2000)
Source: Yanbian tongji nianjian 2001, Yanji, Yanbian renmin chubanshe, 2001, p.70.
 
Table 5 : Characteristics of the Korean population of Yanbian between 1990 and 1999
Source : Ryang Ok-Gûm, ‘Jungguk yônbyôn josônjok jach’iju minjok gwangye ûi hyôngsông gwa
baljôn’(Formation et d éveloppement des relations entre nationalités dans la préfecture autonome des
Coréens de Yanbian), in Kim Kang-II éd., Jungguk josônjok sahwoeûi munhwausewa baljôn jônryak
(Stratégie de développement et valeurs culturelles de la société chaoxianzu de Chine), yanji, Yônbyôn
inmin ch’ulbansa, 2001, p.158.
The influence of the Chaoxianzu in Korean affairs
34 Economically limited, the main influence of the Chaoxianzu in Korean affairs is social
and humanitarian. Particularly striking is the help they give to North Korean refugees.
35 The number of North Korean refugees now living in Yanbian is difficult to estimate.
This is a sensitive subject; and, because the movements of refugees are fluid, any census
is almost impossible. The few available figures concern the number of refugees in China
and are unhelpful, varying between 10,000 and 300,000 according to different estimates
46.  Despite  these  variations,  the  Yanbian prefecture  still  seems to  shelter  the  great
majority of the refugees present on Chinese soil. The flow of refugees into Yanbian,
which  was  very  significant  between  1998  and  2001,  largely  dried  up  during  2002.
Alongside  the  various  campaigns  of  repression,  the  renewal  of  frontier  trade  also
appears responsible for this fall 47. Trade between the frontier towns of Yanbian and
their North Korean neighbours, mainly stimulated by the Chaoxianzu, thus saves a few
North Koreans from having to flee into China to survive. 
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36 When they do arrive in Yanbian, the North Koreans are often helped by the Chaoxianzu.
While it is much too dangerous for the latter to welcome the refugees into their homes
—and this is true even if they are members of their family—they attempt to help them
by providing food or finding jobs for them in farming or forestry. Lastly, the bolder
spirits help the refugees to flee to South Korea via a third country (such as Mongolia or
Thailand) or via one of the many foreign embassies based in Peking. 
37 This solidarity is not systematic, however. Some refugees are, on the contrary, subject
to the arbitrary control of the local people or to organised crime networks. Of these,
women are in the front line. According to some studies, 70-75% of the North Korean
refugees in China are women and, of these, about 60% settle in Yanbian. This female
surplus  is  exacerbated  by  the  male-female  imbalance  in  country  areas  of  the
prefecture. A large number of marriages are arranged between single rural Chaoxianzu
men and women refugees from North Korea 48. 
38 Lastly, because the Chaoxianzu are able to move freely into each of the two Koreas, they
frequently act as go-betweens in arranging meetings or carry letters between North
and South Koreans 49. 
The “de-Koreanisation” of Yanbian and the question of Korean identity
39 Emigration  and  the  slowdown  in  population  growth  have  the  combined  effect  of
reducing the proportion of Yanbian Koreans within the wider community of Chinese
Koreans. Whereas, in 1949, the Yanbian prefecture sheltered more than 60% of China’s
Koreans, today that proportion has fallen to 40% (see Table 6). In the longer term, this
phenomenon raises the question of Korean representation within the governing bodies
of the autonomous prefecture 50. Indeed, according to the 1982 law, the proportion of
officials drawn from a minority community in local political and administrative bodies
must reflect its share of the overall population of the autonomous area. Thus, between
1952 and 2001, in parallel with the relative fall in the numbers of Koreans in Yanbian’s
total population, the proportion of Korean officials has dropped from 78% to 43.1% 51.
Admittedly, the Chinese authorities have guaranteed that national minorities should
fill the senior posts in the autonomous areas and that their share of officials should
always remain above their share of the total population (52); but how will things turn
out? At the local level, this imbalance is perceived as a serious problem, and to address
it the prefecture authorities have been attempting for some time to encourage a higher
birth rate 53.
40 The  depopulation  of  Yanbian  also  threatens  the  Korean  identity  of  the  Chaoxianzu.
Their departure from Yanbian to settle in other towns means that many schools are
forced to close down, but similar schools are not necessarily available at  their new
homes. Thus they are increasingly being assimilated within Chinese Han society 54. Still
worse, according to many Korean intellectuals, the Korean minority is at present on the
verge of disintegration 55. 
41 Such disintegration  is  all  the  more  critical  because  opening  up  Yanbian  to  Korean
influences has not strengthened the Korean identity of the Chaoxianzu. On the contrary,
the Chaoxianzu have become so disillusioned in rediscovering the two Koreas that their
Chinese patriotism has only intensified. 
42 Chinese  Koreans,  for  so  long  attached  to  North  Korea,  which  they  consider  their
country  of  origin,  have  been  badly  disappointed  by  political  and  economic
developments  in their  motherland.  The personality  cult  of  the supreme leader,  the
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emergence of a Kim dynasty, the Juche ideology, the total absence of individual freedom
and the plight of refugees are elements of which they are sharply critical 56. Only family
ties still  connect  them with North Korea,  which they hope will  soon be opened up
economically.
43 Most  of  the  Chinese  Koreans  who have  been to  South  Korea  have  also  been badly
disappointed. Their excitement at visiting this country and their chance to savour its
high level of economic development have been soured by the discovery of a culture and
a social existence that was quite different from theirs and to which they were unable to
adapt 57. What is worse, confronted daily by discriminatory laws, they have not found
themselves treated as real Koreans. By limiting their freedom to settle down and by
making their lives difficult, these laws create a persistently negative image of South
Korea  among the  Chaoxianzu,  many  of  whom return  to  China  determined  never  to
repeat the experience 58.
44 The  numerous  contacts  that  they  have  had  with  the  two  Koreas  have  therefore
consolidated the double identity of the Chinese Koreans. They have today a much more
pragmatic vision of the peninsular, considering it merely as an important economic
and  political  partner.  As  citizens,  first  and  foremost,  of  the  People’s  Republic,  the
Yanbian Koreans do not  represent  a  real  threat  to  the stability  of  the Sino-Korean
frontier 59. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture was
described several times by Peking and by the Jilin provincial authorities as the “model
collectivity” (mofan jiti), meaning that the union between the nationalities there was
judged to be satisfactory 60.  Nevertheless, other sources have qualified this idealised
view. They consider that the Korean minority is an intermediate nationality, “neither
cold nor hot” (bu leng bu re); it is not inclined to separatism, as is the case with national
minorities  in  Tibet  and  Xinjiang,  but  neither  is  it  “without  risk  to  the  social  and
political stability of the region”, particularly because of the relations it maintains with
some citizens of the two Koreas 61.
45 This  ambivalent  situation,  which  varies  from person to  person,  obliges  the  central
government to be wary of the Chaoxianzu, especially when they cause problems for its
diplomatic relations with the two Koreas.
The problems caused by the Yanbian Chaoxianzu to China’s relations with Korea
46 The migration of Chinese Koreans to South Korea and the support they offer to North
Korean refugees are frequently the cause of diplomatic clashes between China and the
two Korean states. These problems are all the more embarrassing in that a significant
criminal factor is involved.
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Table 6: Proportion of Koreans from Yanbian in the whole Korean population of China
Source : Ryang Ok-Gûm, ‘Jungguk yônbyôn josônjok jach’iju minjok gwangye ûi hyôngsông gwa
baljôn’(Formation et d éveloppement des relations entre nationalités dans la préfecture autonome des
Coréens de Yanbian), in Kim Kang-II éd., Jungguk josônjok…, op.cit., p. 158.
The political issues raised by Chaoxianzu immigration in South Korea
47 The  central  government  in  China,  fearful  that  South  Korea  might  win  too  much
influence  over  China’s  Korean  community,  keeps  a  close  eye  on  South  Korean
immigration policy. Moreover, Seoul did not fail to make use of its influence when it
published its law concerning the legal status of Koreans from abroad. Coming into force
on 12 August 1999, this law authorised foreigners of Korean origin to reside in South
Korea without a visa for one or two years, which made it easy for them to look for
work. However, in common with Koreans in Russia, those in China were not affected by
this  law.  Indeed,  the South Korean authorities  accept  as  Koreans from abroad only
those  persons  (or  descendants  of  persons)  who  left  South  Korea  after  1948,  thus
excluding those who were forced to leave the peninsular at the end of the nineteenth
century or during the Japanese occupation 62. While it helped to avoid any friction with
the  Chinese  government,  this  exclusion  provoked  uproar  among  the  immigrant
Chaoxianzu population and also among South Korean Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs), who organised numerous demonstrations in Seoul and sent a petition to the
country’s Constitutional Court. This pressure from part of society obliged the central
government to think again. On 31 August 1999, President Kim Dae-Jung called on the
government to reflect on measures that would enable Koreans from China and Russia
to enjoy the same rights as Koreans from other countries 63. On 10 July 2001, following a
report by several NGOs condemning the discrimination and ill-treatment inflicted on
some Chinese Koreans in South Korea, the justice minister promised to “humanise” his
policy towards them and also to crack down on groups or individuals who exploit them
(64). In the end, on 29 November 2001, South Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled the 1999
law to be in breach of the constitution and ordered that it be revised by the end of 2003
65.
48 Despite  this  apparent  change  of  heart,  the  policy  of  the  South  Korean  authorities
towards Korean immigrants from China has alternated between firmness and kindness
since the start of 2002. Numerous anecdotes concerning the illegal entry of Koreans
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from China before, during and after the staging of the football World Cup in May 2002
have  convinced  the  government  to  strengthen  its  controls  on  immigration  and  to
prepare strict measures to tackle the problem of illegal workers 66. At the same time, it
has authorised Koreans from China to work in the service sector,  enabling them to
apply for visas valid for at least two years 67. This fluctuation in South Korean policy is
the consequence of numerous pressures on the central South Korean government on
two fronts. On the one hand, it has to avoid any friction with the Chinese government.
On the other, it must respond to the expectations of Chaoxianzu immigrants and of the
South Korean NGOs, expectations that were demonstrated afresh in January 2003 when
the NGOs opposed the government’s decision to send some immigrants back to China 68.
49 For its part, the Chinese government criticises any decision to treat the Chaoxianzu like
any other  expatriate  Koreans.  In  its  eyes,  the  Chaoxianzu are—and always  will  be—
Chinese citizens of Korean origin. It would prefer Seoul’s law discriminating against
Chinese Koreans to be kept in force because it helps to encourage their loyalty to the
People’s Republic. Thus, because it gave citizen’s rights to some Korean expatriates on
the basis  of  their  ethnicity,  the  Chinese  government castigated the 1999 law.  Now,
however, judging that if Seoul eventually widens the law to include Chinese Koreans
this will be in defiance of Chinese sovereignty, Peking is sharply opposed to its revision.
This  opposition  is  all  the  stronger  in  that  the  discourse surrounding  notions  of
citizenship, ethnicity and sovereignty is taken up by some extreme right-wing fringe
groups in South Korea who claim Yanbian as Korean territory. To show its displeasure,
Peking  twice  refused,  early  in  2002,  to  issue  Chinese  visas  to  South  Korean  jurists
responsible for visiting Chinese Koreans for talks about the revision of the 1999 law 69. 
50 This was not the first time that the Chinese government had refused entry to South
Koreans. It had already prevented delegates from South Korean NGOs from going to
Yanbian to provide aid for the refugees from North Korea.
Aid for North Korean refugees: a Chaoxianzu-Korean connection that annoys Peking
51 The Chaoxianzu are not the only people helping the North Korean refugees. A few South
Korean NGOs and NGOs set-up by Koreans from abroad (mainly American Koreans),
settled in Yanbian, also regularly come to the aid of the refugees. Alongside the
Chaoxianzu,  these  NGOs  have  even  played  an  important  role  in  transporting  North
Korean  refugees  to  foreign  embassies  in  Peking  70.  While  the  central  government
tolerated, until recent months, the presence of these NGOs—as long as they remained
discreet—it considers their participation in organising expeditions to the embassies to
be in violation of Chinese sovereignty. As these NGOs have also deeply embarrassed the
Chinese government in  its  relations with North and South Korea,  it  has  responded
immediately by cracking down not only on the refugees but also on their accomplices
71.  Furthermore, while the repression of the Chaoxianzu is an internal matter for the
Chinese, the crackdown on the South Korean NGOs is closely watched by the Seoul
authorities—the more so in that some of the NGOs (many being religious in character)
are also playing a leading part in defending the Chaoxianzu in South Korea. Some active
members of the Christian NGOs were thus arrested by the Chinese police who accused
them of proselytising, which is forbidden in China 72. However, being anxious not to get
into a row with Seoul, the Chinese authorities imposed limited penalties, in most cases
freeing them after they had paid heavy fines. These diplomatic limitations explain why
Peking is also attempting to obstruct the work of these NGOs at an earlier stage by
preventing them from coming to China. A black list naming some of their leaders has
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been sent to the Chinese embassy in South Korea, which is ordered not to issue any
more visas to them 73. 
The emergence of an illegal traffic in refugees
52 As many Chinese (including Chaoxianzu) as Koreans from the peninsular are involved in
the criminal network, which is a growing presence in the region. The transporting of
Chaoxianzu to South Korea is accompanied, for example, by a significant traffic in South
Korean passports, forged marriage certificates and work permits. It is more and more
common for South Koreans in Yanbian and the Chinese Northeast to find that their
passports  have  been  stolen  or  unfortunately  misplaced.  As  for  forged  marriage
certificates,  these  can  also  have  two  uses:  some  of  them  can  be  used  to  create  a
marriage between a Chaoxianzu man and a woman refugee from North Korea. Most of
the time, these arranged marriages are in fact forced marriages. The criminal gangs
quickly understood how to benefit  from the situation and they have put in place a
significant network for smuggling women whom they sell to the peasants in Yanbian or
elsewhere. Those who are not sold are switched into the region’s many prostitution
networks. Lastly, in addition to being a centre for the traffic in women, Yanbian is also
an important transit area for drugs coming in from North Korea, most of which are
eventually sold in South Korea 74.
53 While  the  Chinese  and  South  Korean  governments  have  agreed  to  co-operate  in
dismantling the various trafficking networks, some differences persist over the best
methods to adopt.
54 In October 2001, the Chinese authorities executed a smuggler of South Korean origin
without informing the South Korean diplomatic mission in China. The government of
South  Korea  protested  sharply  over  this  act,  which  thus  created  a  new diplomatic
incident.  The  problem was  finally  resolved  during  a  meeting  of  the  two countries’
foreign ministers on 4 November 2001 75.
A much-needed new start for development: xibu dakaifa to the rescue of Tumen?
55 The numerous connections maintained by the Chaoxianzu with the South Korean NGOs
and the North Korean refugees led to the organisation of the sanguan jiaoyu campaign
during the spring and summer of 2002 76. Indeed, even though Chinese studies show
that  the  majority  of  the  Yanbian  Koreans  still  consider  themselves  Chinese,  the
researchers  emphasise  the  need  to  strengthen their  patriotism  and  their  sense  of
cohesion with other  nationalities  (that  is  with the Han)  by improving education 77.
However, the Chinese government is aware that mere educational reforms will not be
enough to resolve the problems. It has recently been attempting to relaunch economic
development in the prefecture. Thus, after setting up a processing and export zone
(chukou jiagong qu) in Hunchun, in April 2000 (78), on 8 March 2001 the State Council
authorised the Yanbian prefecture to receive the benefits of the policy of the “Great
Opening Up of the West” (xibu dakaifa) 79.  This decision was prompted, above all, by
growing pressure from the Yanbian authorities (passed on doubtless by those of Jilin
province)  who,  confronted  with the  failure  of  the  Tumen  programme,  wished  to
relaunch Yanbian’s development 80. Although the prefecture is situated on the edge of
the Northeast, the authorities maintained that Yanbian was an old, poor administrative
frontier entity inhabited by national minorities and could, given these characteristics,
benefit just as much from this policy as the other autonomous prefectures located in
the western provinces 81. So since March 2001 Yanbian has been receiving new state
subsidies and a more advantageous fiscal regime which ought to enable it to attract
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more foreign investment across a greater number of sectors and to profit a little more
from its own fiscal resources. It is also authorised to adopt a few measures to protect
the environment and to develop scientific and technical education as well as zones of
economic  and  technological  co-operation.  Lastly,  Yanbian  has  been  offered  new
prerogatives in promoting tourism and frontier trade.
56 During the year 2001, Yanbian received 550 million yuan (66.3 million US dollars) in
central government. Between 2003 and 2008, the authorities, both central and regional,
are committed to making available 4 billion yuan (481 million dollars) for developing
infrastructure and certain key industrial  projects  which were not completed at  the
time of the first phase of the Tumen programme 82. As regards foreign investment, the
Yanbian authorities have also taken advantage of the fiftieth anniversary to organise
an investment forum in Yanji. It opened from 2 to 4 September 2002 and welcomed
2,270 potential investors from 12 countries. In all, 254 investment projects worth a total
of 1,165 billion dollars, as well as a large number of commercial contracts worth 743
million dollars, were signed 83.
57 The renewed commitment of the central government to developing Yanbian is, as was
the case in the early 1980s, closely linked to the state of its relations with and strategy
towards the two Koreas. Only a few weeks before the two Korean heads of state met for
the Pyongyang summit in June 2000, Kim Jong-Il had paid a secret visit to Peking where
he was  closeted with  the  senior  CCP leaders  84.  On a  second visit  to  China,  during
January  2001,  he  also  went  to  Shanghai  85.  Lastly,  in  September  2001,  Jiang  Zemin
visited Pyongyang for the first time in ten years, which, after all the tensions of the
second half of the 1990s, thus symbolised the restoration of good relations between the
two  countries  86.  In  addition  to  strategic  questions  (including  TMD,  NMD  and  the
presence  of  American  troops  in  South  Korea),  these  meetings  also  provided  an
opportunity for the two governments to discuss economic development. Kim Jong-Il
having praised to the skies the successes of the Chinese reforms, it is not surprising
that, following these meetings, the North Korean regime adopted numerous openness
measures between 2000 and autumn 2002.
58 Justifiably impressed by the many political and economic advances that were made in
the two Koreas during this period, South Korea’s political and economic leaders are
again showing great interest in the Tumen programme, in particular in its potential
role in opening up North Korea and its  importance in connecting up the transport
networks between China and the two Koreas and between the two Koreas themselves.
The  Federation  of  South  Korean  Industries,  encouraged  by  Seoul  and  having
strengthened its links with its Chinese counterpart in February 2001, declared on 22
March 2001 its intention of taking an active part in the development of the Tumen
region. 87.
59 China’s  closer  links  with  North  Korea  have  since  been  overshadowed  by  a  second
nuclear crisis,  which attests  once again to the volatile,  unpredictable and above all
dangerous behaviour of the North Korean regime as well as to the complexity of the
Peking-Pyongyang relationship. Annoyed by this behaviour, the Chinese government
has  taken political  and strategic  measures  that  have  directly  affected Yanbian.  For
example, Peking has told all North Korean officials—those who had been allowed to
stay in the prefecture to hunt down refugees—to return home 88. 
60 While it is too soon to analyse what the relaunch of the Tumen development will lead
to, it is clear that its success will depend not just on resolving this second nuclear crisis
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but also and more particularly on overcoming Yanbian’s present economic problems
(skills  shortage,  problematic  restructuring  of  state  enterprises,  inadequate  foreign
investment and low levels of cross-border trade) 89. The task ahead appears all the more
arduous in that China’s recent accession to the World Trade Organisation is likely to
cause  new  difficulties  for  the  prefecture,  particularly  in  agriculture—which  still
accounts  for  16%  of  Yanbian’s  GDP—and  the  many  state  enterprises  90.  Lastly,  the
Tumen  development  cannot  go  ahead  without  a  significant  inflow  of  foreign
investment, especially from South Korea.
61 We shall also have to watch closely what impact the relaunch of the development will
have on the changing identity of the Chaoxianzu. That most Yanbian Koreans still feel
themselves to be Chinese can largely be attributed to the disillusionment that many
have felt in South Korea. The geopolitical importance of the Korean minority depends
above all on China’s relations with the peninsular. From this perspective, because of the
reactions it will provoke within the Chinese government and among the Chaoxianzu, the
revision of the South Korean law affecting Koreans from abroad will without any doubt
mark  a  critical  stage  in  the  relationship  between  the  two  countries.  It  will  also
represent a basic gauge of the prospects for Korean reunification. Even though it is
hard to foresee what form the new Korean discourse on the frontier and on China’s
Korean minority will take, it is likely that the influence exerted by a reunified Korea on
Yanbian  and  its  Koreans  will  again  be  enormous.  While  one  cannot  put  aside  the
possibility of destabilising influences (91), reunification—and, of course, before that, the
opening  up  of  North  Korea—could  have  a  very  positive  effect  on  economic
development, both for Yanbian and for all of China’s Koreans. In view of its frontier
position, the Yanbian prefecture could then become Korea’s back door into China and
thus profit by its geographical situation in the heart of Northeast Asia. However, this
success will also depend on what strategic perceptions Chinese leaders will then have
of the peninsular, for these still govern their policy towards Yanbian and the Korean
minority.
62 In my work on Chinese frontier policy in Northeast Asia,  I  studied at the Teaching
University  of  Northeast  Changchun  (Jilin)  from  September  2000  to  July  2001  and
travelled several  times to  the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (thanks to  a
grant from France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs). I should like to thank the CEFC for
financing my most recent visits to Yanbian and South Korea during the summer of
2002. I also thank all those who gave me their comments on earlier versions of this
article.
NOTES
1.The People’s Republic of China is home to 2,188,000 Koreans, 97% of whom live in the
three provinces of the Northeast (Jilin: 61%; Heilongjiang: 23%; Liaoning: 12%). In Jilin,
apart from the Autonomous Prefecture of Yanbian, the Koreans are also strongly
represented in the autonomous county of Changbai (home to 16% of the nationwide
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Korean population) as well as eleven villages, of which five are Korean-Manchu, and
one town. In Heilongjiang and Liaoning, the Korean minority lives mainly in villages
(26) and towns (10). For more details on the distribution of the Korean minority in
China, cf. Zhu Zaixian, “Dui Zhongguo Chaoxianzu renkou fenbu yu tedian jiqi fazhan qushi de
fenxi” (Analysis of the distribution of the population and of the characteristics of
China’s Korean minority as well as of development prospects), in Chaoxianzu yanjiu
luncong (research series on the Korean minority), Vol. 5, edited by the Research Centre
on Nationalities of Yanbian University, Yanji, Yanbian daxue chubanshe, 2001, pp.
223-249. 
2.The other autonomous prefectures are located in other regions of China in the west,
the southwest and the south, mainly in the provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou and
Gansu, and in the five autonomous regions. 
3.To describe it, Chinese specialists on nationalities use the phrases qianru minzu
(immigrant nationality) and kuajing minzu (transnational nationality). Interviews, Yanji,
May 2001. 
4.During our stay in Yanbian in August 2002, one month before the festivities began,
numerous slogans were displayed proclaiming the need for economic development. For
more details on the Yanbian anniversary, cf. Zhao Yang, “50th Anniversary of Founding
of Yanbian’s Korean Autonomous Prefecture”, China Radio International, September 2002,
http://english.cri.com.cn/english/2002/sep/69718.htm 
5.Each September in Yanbian is the month selected for the broadcasting of propaganda
about the union of nationalities (minzu tuanjie xuanchuan yue). It is always timed to
coincide with the celebration of the anniversary of the founding of Yanbian as an
autonomous administrative entity for national minorities. Xu Mingzhe, Dangdai yanbian
Chaoxianzu shehui fazhan duice fenxi (Analyses and counter-measures of the development
of society among the Yanbian Koreans today) Shenyang, Liaoning minzu chubanshe,
2001, p. 363. 
6.Sanguan jiaoyu is an education movement organised by the central government and
the provincial authorities whenever the latter judge that unity between the
nationalities is in danger, whether because tension arises between the Han and the
minorities or because the minority or the minorities step outside certain guidelines laid
down by the authorities. This type of campaign is invariably aimed at the national
minorities and is always carried out in minority areas (provinces, prefectures or
counties). As its name suggests, the sanguan jiaoyu is the teaching of the three guan
(which we may translate as idea, concept or conception). These three concepts are 
zhuguoguan (zhu = to reside, guo = country, namely China; no one should forget that the
national minorities reside in the country, that is to say in China), minzuguan (no one
should forget that these are nationalities of China, a multinational state and that they
enjoy certain privileges at the political, economic and social level) and lishiguan (lishi =
history; no one should forget that historically the minorities are part of China and that
they have participated in the founding of this multinational state). The exact definition
of the three concepts is a little vague; the few researchers who refer to them also give
no precise definitions. To sum up, the sanguan jiaoyu is a campaign aimed at making the
national minorities aware that the country, the state and China are more important
than their nationality and that, while the specific nationality is respected (from the
perspective of the centre), the national minorities must not set it above the state.
Interviews, Yanji, 1 and 3 August 2002; Xu Mingzhe, op. cit., 2001, pp. 384-385. The 
sanguan jiaoyu campaign was relaunched in spring 2003 in Yanbian. The intention is
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preventive; the campaign is directly connected with the revision of the South Korean
law on Koreans from abroad, which is to take place between now and the end of 2003.
7.Yanbian chaoxianzu zizhizhou zhi (Records of the Autonomous Prefecture of the
Yanbian Koreans), Peking, Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp. 253-354; Bruno Lasker, Les peuples
de l’Asie en mouvement, Paris, Payot, 1946, p. 100. 
8.We are concerned here with the treaties of Aïgoun and Peking. The treaty of Aïgoun,
signed on 16 May 1858, placed the frontier between China and Russia along the River
Amour, the areas lying to the south of the Amour and between the River Oussouri and
the sea under Chinese and Russian dual jurisdiction. Two years later, the Peking treaty
permanently transferred these territories to Russia, which meant China lost its access
to the sea. 
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